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The recent revolutionary changes in the cognitive psychology of development, 
touching upon the basic conceptions of psychology, are generalized in this article. 
The problem of theoretical changes connected with systemic evolutionary ap-
proach, dynamic nonlinear system theory, and connectionism, is discussed. The 
author analyses four basic theses of revolutionary changes: from sensory-motor 
infant to representative one; from the leading role of activity to the unity of per-
ception and action; about the continuity of the subject formation, instead of axiom 
of subjectivity of the adult, mature person; about the continuance of genetic and 
environmental instead of social primacy in the mental development of a person. 
There are key arguments of new conceptions, obtained by the author and other 
researchers.
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Revolution in infancy psychology has begun in the 60th and gradu-
ally included practically all representations of mind origins in the human 
ontogenesis. First of all, it has touched upon the issue of knowledge ori-
gin, role of actions in the mental development, mental representations’ 
formation, basics of the person, and subjects. It is impossible to consider 
all the fundamental questions, affected by empirical-theoretical revolu-
tion; so, the author dwells on several basic and fundamental moments, 
which were analyzed by her pupils, colleagues, and herself over the time 
of more than 30 years of work.
The basic changes in the developmental psychology, touching upon 
the basic problems of psychology are related to the research of early hu-
man ontogenesis. The ontogenesis research shows that development of 
the most organized levels depends on base, primary steps. These base, 
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plored, especially in our domestic psychology. In the world psycholo-
gical science, the basic stress of mental processes research was set on 
the area of infant’s development. It is manifested by increasing num-
ber of publications, and by discussion of the problems of early stages 
of development in traditionally “adult” and authoritative journals, such 
as “Cognition” and “Trend of Cognitive Sciences”. Some new journals 
have gained popularity among scientists: “Developmental Science”, “In-
fancy” etc.
It is explained by two reasons. First, the theoretical discussions on 
one of the basic problems of psychology – determination of mind has 
become pointed, by going on to the new level of generalization of em-
pirical material and new theoretical approaches. The practical strategies 
of organization of education, training, correction, and comprehension 
of the rehabilitation opportunities of one or another mental disorder 
depend on the answer to the question – how the biological (genetic) 
and environmental development factors interact. Second, methods of 
infancy study are improved, allowing to get more reliable and repro-
ducible results. Increase of theoretical and experimental interest to the 
period of early ontogenesis has led to the planned reconsideration of the 
representations of human mental development, especially his cognitive 
abilities. The very fundamental and detailed development of psychology 
problems, from the position of the system – the evolutionary dynam-
ics, is the most topical and perspective in the context of the world psy-
chological science. This thesis is confirmed by the system-dynamic ap-
proach (Dynamic systems’ approach) – authors Esther Thelen and Linda 
Smith (Thelen, and Smith, 1994; 1998), which is the most widespread, 
not only in developmental psychology, but in the general psychology as 
well. Many theses of the given approach are deeply intertwined with the 
theses of the system-evolutionary approach.
The authors, specifying the basic origins of the approach, name the 
nonlinear physics and N.N. Bernstein’s works. Many principles of the 
dynamic system approach are consistent with the representation of the 
system-evolutionary approach, which is intensively developed in the do-
mestic science (Aleksandrov, 2004; Field, Woodson, Greenberg, and Co-
hen, 1982; Gregory, 1970; Lomov, 1984; Naisser, 1981). These approaches 
represent the unity of genetic and environmental in human mind, devel-
op theses on the level system nature of development and mind function-
ing. However, there are some essential distinctions between them.
1. Self-organization – the main principle of development and behav-
iour. The continuity of systems change includes the continuity of envi-
ronmental requirements changes that leads to the adaptive behaviour. 
(The given thesis is elaborated in the system-evolutionary theory as it 
explains environmental attack selectivity).
2. An external behaviour of the individual is caused by neuronal 
systems. Movement from one condition of the organism to another – is 
a continuously connected ensemble of related components. The coali-
tion nature of the systems components is of fundamental importance: 
no component is preferred, that provides the occurrence of new forms, 
owing to the shifts in the coalition interaction of the systems compo-
nents and new components inclusion. One can compare this thesis to 
the thesis of the system approach on non-reducibility of the system to 
any of its components.
3. Development is a continuous change of forms of behaviour in-
time; stable conditions change, lose stability and change in time.
4. Development is learning. There is no sense in dividing these pro 
cesses. The organism continuously and actively changes, and its neuronal 
conditions and physical parameters change as well. Some changes hap 
pen quickly, the others take many months and years. Processes of learn-
ing and development are interlaced with one another. Every new condi-
tion depends on the previous one (This thesis most closely corresponds 
to the system-evolutionary approach).
5. There is no sense in dividing “knowledge” and “actions”. There is 
no sense to ask the child what he really “knows” and what he can “do”.
In the child’s behaviour all these moments are unified for the task 
performance. The behaviour can be stable at the performance of many 
tasks and fragile at the performance of the same tasks, but under differ-
ent circumstances. Therefore, there is no gap between perception and 
action, knowledge and behaviour.
The theory of nonlinear dynamic systems is applied mainly to the 
motor development and functioning. While applying this theory to the 
cognitive development, the authors experience some difficulties. Theory 
of Thelen and Smith characterizes knowledge as dynamic, adaptive, and 
self-organizing. It occurs little by little, as motor, from one system condi-
tion into another. Infants improve cognitive skills through the processes 
of environment study, based on perception and action. Infants’ actions 
are made as self-organizing motor and neuronal subsystems that lead to 330 Elena A. Sergienko Revolution in the Cognitive Psychology of Development 331
the stable conditions of coordination at meeting a problem. Hence, ac-
tion, inseparably from perception and complex “perception – action”, is 
a basis of natural categories in accordance with which all cognitive skills 
are formed in future. Transition from perception to knowledge inevita-
bly assumes formation of categories. According to the theory of Thelen 
and Smith, formation of categories is self-organization of perception and 
action connected with it. However, the theory experiences complexities 
when interpreting data on very early processes of categorization of infants 
and neonates (imitation of facial expressions and gestures is possible by 
neonates, selectivity is typical as early as the stage of prenatal develop-
ment) (Meltzoff, and Moore, 1977; 1998; Reznick, Corley, and Robinson, 
1997). It seems to be necessary to expect from the very beginning a cog-
nitive readiness for selectivity, which underlies the categorization.
In spite of existing distinctions between the theory of nonlinear dy-
namic systems and connectionism, there is more similarity, than dis-
tinction (Thelen, and Bates, 2003). The self-organization principle is re-
alized in the theory of connectionism, in the nonlinear dynamic system, 
and the system-evolutionary theory. Distinctions between the theory of 
nonlinear dynamic systems and connectionism lay to a greater extent in 
the following positions. The structuring role of the external information 
is recognized by all theories, but not equally. For the theory of nonlinear 
dynamic systems and for connectionism the role of the external infor-
mation is critical. It can lead to absolutely various results, but results 
are not contained in the environment. Connectionism lays the great 
emphasis on the mutual relations of the external information and the 
internal structures. Internal, mental representations define the selectiv-
ity of the external information. “Hidden regulations” define the external 
consequences. While in Thelen-Smith theory, the external information 
actually plays the generating role.
Development of knowledge from simple to complex is the sensory-
motor basis of cognition. This principle was the fundamental one in the 
theory of J. Piaget and in the theory of dynamic systems. Connection-
ism, to a greater extent, is centred on mental representations, defining 
the cognitive development. This distinction applies to “mental represen-
tations”, which are absent in the theory of dynamic systems and consid-
ered by connectionism as the internal structures of development.
There are distinctions in the dynamic systems understanding in 
two modern approaches. The idea of nonlinear dynamic of changes, 
sensitivi  ty to entry conditions, and unexpected transformations accord-
ing to the type of catastrophe are common to these approaches. The 
transforma  tions  explain  U-shaped  development  of  functions,  which 
takes place after gradual changes in certain amount of parameters. But 
systems change in the dynamic approach implies a coalition of percep-
tion and action, whereas connectionism is the dynamics of changes in 
the mental structures.
Some distinctions can be observed in the application of mathemati-
cal formalization in both approaches. Both theories widely use the math-
ematical device for descriptions’ formalization. However, in the dynamic 
systems theories, formalization is directed to behaviour description (for 
example, dynamics of changes from pace to running), while in connec-
tionism, the architecture and learning functions are formalized at the 
level of mental representations.
The author of the given work adheres to the opinion of the system-
evolutionary approach, which is a kind of synthesis of three named di-
rections. Sharing opinion of the principle of developments continuity, 
inseparability of genetic and environmental factors as full participators 
of development, I also agree with the representation about indirect de-
velopments by mental structures, i.e. recognizing the unity of perception 
and action, and considering the presence of at least crude generalized 
internal representations as a necessary part of this mechanism activity. 
I like the idea of dynamic systems and their changes by a principle of 
catastrophe, the gradual transformation of internal state. However, the 
dynamic approach does not give answers to many specific questions on 
the mechanisms of sensitivity and selectivity. Moreover, in the system-
evolutionary approach, the principle of anticipatory development is em-
phasized as the basic one and the author has bent every effort to this 
principle development (Sergienko, 1992).
I would like to specify one more circumstance that explains the in-
creasing popularity of the research on the early periods of mental develop-
ment. At the present stage of psychology development, the integration of 
different areas of psychological knowledge has been outlined. Interoscu-
lation of different paradigms of research, comprehension of the common 
subject in the human study promotes not only the growth of interdisci-
plinary research, but also the formation of general psychological science, 
which would be better defined as a human science that was foreseen by 
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In domestic psychology, the development principle in the human 
mentality study is considered as the fundamental one (L.I. Antsyferova, 
A.V.  Brushlinsky,  L.S.  Vygotsky,  D.N.  Zavalishina,  A.V.  Zaporozhez, 
V.P. Zinchenko, A.N. Leontiev, M.I. Lisina, B.F. Lomov, J.A. Ponomarev, 
V.B. Shvyrkov, Y.I. Aleksandrov and others) (see, for example, Aleksan-
drov, 2004; Ancyferova, Zavalishina, and Ry`balko, 1988; Brushlinsky, 
2003;  Lomov,  1984;  Sergienko,  1992;  Shvirkov,  1988;  Zaporozhecz, 
2000). However, only a few are busy with the early ontogenesis develop-
ment of human mentality. While the revolutionary changes, which are 
extremely important for the whole psychological science, are connected 
with the development psychology,this revolution is hardly reflected by 
the scientific community of our country, but is intensively discussed in 
the world psychology.
As long as several decades ago, many regulations on human knowl-
edge of reality seemed to be settled and stable in psychology. Timid 
attempts  to  deviate  from  the  traditional  scheme  were  apprehended 
sharply and even oversensitively. How to describe the process of gain-
ing knowledge of the world? At first, a person receives some sensations, 
while interacting with the world; then these sensations are transformed 
into perception of object or event, thus, we receive a perceptible image, 
which can become a representation and finally a conception, i.e. valu-
able knowledge of separate aspects of the world. The similar scheme of 
cognitive process broke off and separated the processes of sensation and 
perception, and the processes of thinking; moreover, it made the pro-
cesses of the object choice, their subjective transformation, and descrip-
tion absolutely inexplicable.
In the cycle of works on studying the anticipation development in 
early human ontogenesis, stated in the author’s works (Sergienko, 1992), 
it has been shown that anticipation is not only the attribute of the human 
activity, it is more universal, immanent characteristic of the human mind 
organization and evolution of forms of mind organization. Anticipation 
phenomena are considered not only as the spatio-temporal effects of an-
ticipatory actions, but also as effects of selectivity. We may assume, that 
selectivity is a result of prototypical mechanism, while the space-time 
surpass of events modally reflects the specific mechanism of coding and 
mental storage. It is shown, that continuity is the basic characteristic of 
the human mind organization that defines the anticipation effects both 
in micro-and in macro-genesis. The given results are in line with the rep-
resentations of close inseparable link with perceptive and thought pro-
cesses, which are not realized consistently, but represented in the unified 
process of the cognitive analysis.
Modern cognitive psychology, starting with the works of J. Bruner 
(Bruner, 1977), R. Gregory (Gregory, 1970), W. Naisser (Naisser, 1981) and 
others, proceeds from the hypothesis that perception process is a process 
of acceptance of the intellectual decision, beyond which the perception 
does not exist. This decision is not realized and therefore, the subject of 
perception takes it as direct datum. Besides, this decision is possible only 
on the grounds of considering the perceived object among one or other 
class of subjects, one or other category, starting with the categories of ob-
jects (“table”, “chair”), motion and ending with the categories of causality. 
Some of these categories (perceptive hypotheses) are formed on the basis 
of natural organizing principles (substantiality and continuity); the others 
are formed during the experiment. That is why, the perception is insepa-
rable from thinking and has not only individual character, but generic, 
generalized, and universal as well. Hence, the lowest and the highest levels 
of mind organization are not diametrically opposed, but continuously in-
teract (Lectorsky, 2001). At the heart of this continuity are the principles 
of anticipation, unity of perception, action, and representation.
These  representations  indicated  the  first  thesis  of  revolutionary 
changes. The first thesis of revolutionary changes states that infant is not 
a sensory-motor individual, devoid of the ordered mental structures, and 
deep in chaos of sensations, as it was believed earlier. Infant is a repre-
sentative individual who is richly talented in structuring and regulating 
the world.
The infants’ ability to anticipate is a weighty argument confirming 
the drawn conclusion. A source of non-sensory conceptual activity of an 
infant is the representation of spatial characteristics of objects and events. 
Conceptually, the perceptive analysis of spatial structure may result in 
the mental descriptions of figurative schemes’ type, which become pre-
cursory conceptions, such as “living”, “agent”, and “receptacle”. Figurative 
schemes are the representation of perceptive structures of events, such 
as spatial attitudes and spatial motion, which characterize the event as a 
receptacle. Figurative schemes formation uses the active abstraction of 
the key information on the events that are coded in nonperceptive form, 
representing the value. These values are simple conceptions: “Top – bot-
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values, is unconscious and its content is filled up in the process of cog-
nitive development of the child (Baillargeon, and Su-hua Wang, 2002; 
Meltzoff, and Moore, 1998; Sergienko, 1996; Spelke, et al., 1992).
In spatio-temporal effects of anticipation we find the proof of 
infants’ ability to figurative schemes formation. Infants are able to 
anticipate the disappearance of an object. The presence of various 
strategy of searching movements of eyes is the reliable evidence that 
at the heart of this ability lays the spatial characteristics’ representa-
tion. In our work, we clearly demonstrate that even two-month-old 
children show the discrete and continuous strategy in problems of 
object disappearance behind the screens of different size. The choice 
of adequate strategy of executive action points out the existence of 
internal representations, making a variation of executive behaviour 
possible (Sergienko, 1992).
The detailed analysis of infants’ dynamics of executive actions (in 
the form of oculomotor strategy) gives rise to the idea that, most likely, 
there is at least a crude representation of the space, based on the abil-
ity to integrate space-time relations. The presence of congenital or early 
nascent ability to space representation does not mean that it is strictly 
programmed and invariable. It is rather a directional availability for in-
tegration, more exact setting is made by the problem itself. Representa-
tion of the space integrity is an important constituent of the physical 
world understanding, according to the use of continuity law (Sergienko, 
1992; Spelke, et al., 1992).
Such an early “understanding” of some regulations of the physi-
cal world existence is proved to be true by facts about human neonate’s 
imitation of facial (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, and Cohen, 1982) and 
manual gestures (Meltzoff, and Moore, 1977; 1998) of adults. Multiple 
confirmed experiments with infants’ imitation make us agree, that long 
before the age of eigh months, estimated by Piaget as the first stage of 
sensory-motor integration, the infants demonstrate their ability to inte-
grative actions, which assume a representation.
The inter-modal interaction is a certain mechanism of active rep-
resentation formation. Our research on the functioning anticipatory 
schemes in the early period of infancy and data about the development 
of inter-modal interactions in conditions of early visual deprivation 
show, that there is a primary integration of perception and action, as-
suming the representation feature (Sergienko, 2004).
Data of numerous researches, including the researches by the au-
thor, count clearly in favour of the hypothesis of the infant’s ability to 
representation  (Baron-Cohen,  2000;  Sergienko,  1996;  Spelke,  et  al., 
1992; Thelen, and Bates, 2003). Infants of the earliest period of develop-
ment have an active representation of some aspects of the physical world 
existence. Thus, their ability to represent and to “interpret” the physical 
world develops at an early age, surpassing the ability to act actively in 
this world. Three or four-months’ old babies are not capable of talking 
about objects, can not locomote around it and actively manipulate with 
it. Besides, they see the objects at low resolving capacity. At the same 
time, infants of this age can represent the objects that are dropping out 
of sight, interpret their latent movements, and “know” about their exis-
tence space. Infants represent the objects and their movement causality 
according to such characteristics of material bodies’ behaviour, as conti-
nuity and substantiality (Sergienko, 1996).
The data, received by us and other researchers, refute Piaget’s thesis 
that physical knowledge depends on interiority of sensory-motor struc-
tures and increases gradually in the process of formation of perception 
and action coordination. Besides, the results of conducted experiments 
negate the statements of various empirical theories supporters, assert-
ing that solely actions in physical world can be the source of knowledge 
about it. Representations arise owing to this world objects active ma-
nipulation or locomotion around them; otherwise, representations are 
impossible till the mastering of language and gestures.
Our study of infants with a congenital cataract and congenially blind 
infants can serve as one of the arguments that action does not mediate 
the development of physical world knowledge so straight. These infants’ 
actions with objects do not develop till the formation of the objects’ con-
stancy representations and they have essential developmental lag from 
sighted infants because of sight absence, which serves as the integrator 
in the interaction. Essential delays are also observed in locomotion de-
velopment, which are also controlled and induced by the mental repre-
sentation of environment (Fraiberg, 1977; Sergienko, 2002).
However, it does not imply an invariability of base representations. 
The role of perception and action as inseparable parts of any interaction, 
being improved, develops the representation, which has a congenital ba-
sis. This basis can be designated as a core or a kernel of knowledge or as an 
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troduction (representation) of the external world, which directs the per-
ception and organizes the action, and that, in its turn, develops, changes, 
and supplements the original, base conception. The adduced proofs and 
facts count in favour of basics and very early basis of life conception, 
which the adult operates with, and deny the thesis about an invariability 
of conceptions.
Similar representations have something in common with I. Kant’s 
idea of thinking spontaneity. The basis of thinking spontaneity is the 
ability for imagination (at the heart of which is the representation, if 
we use modern language). Owing to imagination, intellect creates its 
own conceptions, in addition to the consciousness control. Imagina-
tion  workmanship  is  conditioned  by  finished  structures  (categories) 
and by empirical material. Categories have schemes. The schemes are 
the product of imagination. A priori knowledge, by Kant, differs from 
Plato’s congenital ideas. Only forms are a priori (or the organization 
principles, in modern interpretation), as to the content, it entirely de-
pends on experience. There are two a priori pre-experimental forms: 
space and time. Synthesizing activity of knowledge already begins at 
the level of feeling (compare it to the hypothesis of categoriality percep-
tion by J. Bruner and R. Gregory). Here a threefold synthesis becomes 
perceptible: grasping the representations, reduction of the varied con-
tents of contemplation to the common image, further reproduction of 
representations in memory and, at the end, apperception – recognition, 
identification of representations with the phenomenon. This threefold 
synthesis is carried out on the basis of imagination. Categories penetrate 
into feelings, making them meaning-bearing. Categories are a priori, 
not congenital. They are created on their own during the clear mind epi-
genesis. J. Goethe emphasized, that Kant the first one to introduce the 
imagination as a necessary constituent part of the perception.
The cited philosophical views of Kant, in spite of their argumentative-
ness, cause direct analogies with modern representations of necessity of 
inclusion into perception the anticipatory schemes, assuming selectivity 
and ordering of interaction, and with modern representations of self-de-
velopment, including thinking, when the internal mechanisms of devel-
opment are as potentials (forms), which are realized (content) through 
the environmental experience, according to the laws of the environment 
organization. The epigenesis principle resolves the contradiction in di-
chotomy of genes-environment, biological-social, congenital – acquired.
The second thesis of revolutionary conceptual changes is connected 
with the first one. According to the classical theories of mental develop-
ment, conceptions’ formation is caused by the actions of infants. The 
modern  developmental  psychology  has  shown,  that  long  before  the 
infant is capable to carry out manipulations with objects and to move 
actively, he is more cognitively competent, than it was imagined before. 
Perception and action are integral parts of the uniform system of in-
teractions controlled by the general laws.
On the basis of other authors’ research (Bertenthal, 1996; Sergienko, 
2004) and at first hand, in the field of early ontogenesis, the author offers 
a hypothesis of the opportunity to mark out two functional subsystems 
in the uniform system of perception and action – perceptual control of 
action and identification. Differences in the functioning organization of 
these subsystems are in the positions of interaction with the surround-
ing world (allocentric – egocentric), type of coding and storage of the 
information (amodal coding – modally specific), degree of realization 
(the higher degree is typical for identification system), and peculiarities 
of anticipation effects (space-time anticipation – selective expectation).
Both subsystems develop from the moment of birth; however, the 
subsystem perceptual control achieves more mature level of organiza-
tion before identification subsystem. In spite of dissociation features 
between two subsystems, their functioning is controlled by represen-
tations organized hierarchically and become more active according to 
the tasks. Coordination of perception and action takes place through 
the abstract structures of representation, which can be amodal and 
modally-specific as well. What format of knowledge storage will be 
used depends on the kind of problem the subject faces. It seems, that 
both types of representative storage develop ever since the birth, but 
amodal coding provides the base levels of information processing to 
a greater extent, than the modal-specific coding, as it gives the most 
general representation of space – time characteristics of the objects, 
events and ways of actions. Detailed elaboration of a scene assumes 
the modal-specific coding and higher organized levels of the actions 
organization. Thus, we believe in the existence of level organization of 
representations – perceptions – actions.
Another major aspect of revolutionary changes in developmental 
psychology, touching cognitive development as well, is the problem of 
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In domestic psychology, with hypersocialization as a dominant, in-
fant’s mental development is responsibility of adult as a representative 
of society, without which any development of the supreme mental func-
tions is impossible. The author carried out a number of works in this 
direction (Sergienko, 1992; 1996; 2002). In the view of the similar hy-
persocialized approach, the infant remains an influence object, not the 
subject. Our point of view is that the infant since the beginning of his 
existence (perinatal life) is provided with his own individuality, which 
is formed of the type originality of its structures and functions, which, 
certainly,  include  general,  specific,  universal  components,  especially 
unique ones. This individual component of the infant’s (at first, a fetus’) 
behaviour is determined not only by the uniqueness of his genetic roots, 
but also by the uniqueness of his development history, which, along with 
typical nature, brings its peculiarities into the infant’s behaviour, abili-
ties, and his mental world formation.
Therefore, we consider it necessary to take proper account of hu-
man individuality at all stages of his development. Human individuality 
is closely connected with the subject’s category. The given category, to 
which such scientists as S.L. Rubinstein, KA. Abulkhanova, B.G. Anan-
jev, D.N. Uznadze and many others made a huge contribution (Sergien-
ko, 2002), is fully developed by A.V. Brushlinsky within the framework 
of the subject-activity approach (Brushlinsky, 2003).
Development of a person as a subject is continuous in human on-
togenesis, opening the levels of his formation, which have specific cri-
teria (the third thesis). Thus, all levels are interconnected and correlated 
that assumes a historical connection of the level criteria of subjectivism 
(Sergienko, 2002). It was originally offered to single out two levels: pro-
tosubjectivism (primary subjectivism (separating oneself as a subject 
of interaction from the external world and the world of other people – 
about two-months’old or younger) and secondary subjectivism (infant’s 
ability to share the common mental state with other people – a triangle 
of relations – I-object - the other person – about nine-months’old).
During the last years, researchers singled out two more levels con-
nected with the formation of the model of mind, which reflect the op-
portunities  of  human  behaviour  as  a  subject  of  activity  (Sergienko, 
2005). Thereupon, the experimental and theoretical analysis has sepa-
rated the level of an agent (3-4 years’ old) and the level of a naive subject 
(5-6 years’ old). At the level of an agent, the infant can start to separate 
his own model of mind from the model of mind of all others. Though 
the comparison of these models is still complicated, it is possible only in 
the primitive situations that allow to predict the consequences of own 
and others’ actions, whereas the manipulations with the others’ model 
of mind are still inaccessible. For example, children of 3-4 years can al-
ready understand that if they know that the box of sweets is used for 
keeping threads, the other may not know it and make a mistake, try-
ing to take a candy from this box. As for children up to 3-4 years, they 
identify their knowledge, emotions, and intentions with the knowledge, 
emotions and intentions of others. At the level of a naive subject, there 
is an ability of understanding and comparison of models of mind (I – 
the other person). Such comparison leads to the attempts to manipulate 
the model of others with the purpose of changing the representations of 
event or causality: i.e. the ability to deception forms. First, deception ap-
pears as a cognitive phenomenon of mental development, and only later 
there is a moral aspect of deception as a reflection of social norms and 
rules of interaction of people.
In foreign researches of mind understanding (Theory of Mind) 
there are disagreements in determining the age, at which the human 
being starts to understand (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Meltzoff, and Moore, 
1998; Perner, 1991). This ability has proved to be vulnerable for test-
ing, and depending on the task, conditions of its presentation, different 
ages are named (from 3 till 6 years). But the majority of authors name 
the age of fouryears as the period of formation of the mind model, 
the time when the children are capable to understand the problem of 
incorrect opinions. Many authors consider the very problem of incor-
rect opinion as a key for mind model. Level approach to the analysis 
of formation of mind model removes the mentioned disagreements, 
and the use of various tasks in one research helps to avoid mistakes in 
interpretation.
The general conclusion of works in the Theory of Mind direction 
consists in the criticism of J. Piaget’s conceptions about representative in-
telligence formation (Perner, 1991). We should remind, that Piaget con-
sidered that infants could understand other people only at the stage of 
specific operations when they overcome egocentrism of thinking, which 
does not let to present any other point of view, other perspective . Chil-
dren at the age of four are capable to understand the mental conditions of 
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In J. Perner’s recent work with colleagues (Meltzoff, and Moore, 
1998; Perner, 1991), the different understanding of criticism of J. Piaget’s 
theory was offered. For describing the intellectual development Piaget 
used verbal descriptions, which showed how children progressed to 
revelation of the properties of logic universe in a stream of indepen-
dent egocentric perspectives , coordinating these perspectives into an 
objective picture. For example, the relations of objects of “a tree behind 
the stone” and “a tree in front of the stone” types as relations of A–В 
and В–A can not be integrated without understanding that these are 
the different points of view on the same scene: relations of your and 
my perspectives. Hence, the way of mutual relations understanding is 
in interpretation of the scene components as belonging to different per-
spectives . Little by little, infants come to this integration. First, they 
reveal different perspectives , and then they gain ability to the different 
perspectives’ confrontation, and only after that the multiperspective vi-
sion. The ability to confrontation of perspectives appears at the age of 
four, and it is connected with the problems of incorrect opinion. So, if 
Bill has left a chocolate in the box A and his mother put it to the box 
B, Bill, having returned will look for it in box A. Bill's incorrect opin-
ion would not be in agreement with the reality (chocolate is in box B). 
Beat is wrong thinking that chocolate is in box A, but the chocolate had 
been there and this is a true opinion. Whereas the problem of A being 
behind B, and В being in front of A depends only on the position of the 
observer, that demands multiperspective representation (same as in the 
problem of Piaget called “Three mountains”) and starts to form at the 
age of seven-eight (just as by Piaget).
There are two conclusions following these comparisons. The first 
conclusion is that our opinion on necessity of the level analysis of mind 
model formation and of more versatile analysis of the problems in these 
researches is proved. The second conclusion is that in Piaget’s theory 
infant’s cognitive development apparently dissociates with development 
of his understanding and requires the other level of mental organiza-
tion. Then, Piaget’s criticism is reduced to the criticism of description 
of other cognitive development aspects, based on metacognitive struc-
tures’ formation at preoperational and specific mentality levels.
The fourth thesis deals with the representations dominating not 
only in the majority of people, but in experts as well. It states that early 
development of an infant is under a much more intensified genetic con-
trol, than at older age, and especially in the adult period. Revolutionary 
changes of these representations are connected with psychogenetic data 
that have demonstrated the extension of genetic effect on variability 
of mental development after a number of years and the maximum ef-
fect at middle age. Psychogenetic constrains to reconsider the represen-
tations of critical periods and their determination, significantly contrib-
ute to genetic factors in the development of speech and individuality i.e. 
to reconsider the understanding of key regulations of the determinants 
of mental and cognitive developments (Reznick, Corley, and Robinson, 
1997; Sergienko, 2002; Spelke, et al., 1992). Does it mean that it is neces-
sary to abandon the representations of importance of surroundings and 
social factors in the infant mental development? Certainly, it does not. 
Genetic concept without environmental one, as well as environmental 
concept without genetic one are absolutely empty. These two forces make 
a persistent continuum of interactions, only the “force” of their applica-
tions to the different moments of human life and to different abilities is 
changed (Sergienko, 2002).
In conclusion, the author should emphasize that she considers the 
presented analysis of revolutionary changes in cognitive and develop-
mental psychology as the current situation. Many questions brought up 
here require development and more detailed research. However, one 
thing remains constant – the belief that the development problems’ solv-
ing is in the genetic approach and psychology can reveal the essence of 
mental phenomena only by the analysis of development dynamics.
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